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The most prominent feature of the constitutional work of the
Supreme Court during the Chief Justiceship of Salmon P. Chase
was a series of decisions concerned with the Civil War and with
measures adopted in its wake. Many of these cases I have considered in an earlier installment of this study." There remain for discussion not only the celebrated Slaughter-House Cases,' in which
a sharply divided Court wrestled for the first time with the construction of the constitutional amendments adopted in response to
the war, but a plethora of other decisions, most of which also dealt
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I should like to thank Paul
Mishkin, Michael E. Smith, Geoffrey Stone, and Cass Sunstein for helpful criticism and
Mark Holmes for valuable research assistance.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 18651873, 51 U. CM L. REV. 131 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Currie VI]. For previous installments, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Cm. L. Rav.
819 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Currie I]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Cm. L. Rv. 646 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Currie H]; The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and CongressionalPowers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CM L. Ra,. 887 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Currie I]; The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contractsand Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 471 [hereinafter cited as Currie IV]; Currie: The Constitutionin the Supreme Court: Article IV and
Federal Powers, 1836-64, 1983 DuKE L.J. 695 [hereinafter cited as Currie V]. The entire
study of the Court's first hundred years will be published in book form by the Univerisity of
Chicago Press.
2 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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with limitations on the powers of the states. These cases are the
subject of the present article.

I.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

In 1851, after years of haggling,3 a majority of the Justices had
agreed, in the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, that the
commerce clause of article I, though phrased simply as a grant of
authority to Congress, implicitly precluded the states from enacting laws on commercial "subjects" that were "in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation."' 4 In Cooley itself, however, the challenged state law had been
upheld. In the remaining fourteen years of Chief Justice Taney's
tenure, moreover, despite frequent opportunities, the Cooley doctrine had never again been mentioned, and no state law had been
struck down explicitly on the basis of the commerce clause.5 It was
during Chase's tenure that the Court resuscitated Cooley and first
made the negative effect of the clause a reality.' The road the
Court traveled in so doing was by no means smooth; the confused
body of decisions handed down in this field by Chase and his
brethren suggests the depth of the can of worms that Cooley had
opened up and that we have never since succeeded in closing.
A.

Gilman v. Philadelphia

The Court's first significant encounter with the commerce
clause after Chase's appointment came in 1866 in Gilman v. Philadelphia,7 in which a wharf owner attacked a Pennsylvania statute
authorizing the construction of a bridge over the Schuylkill River
that would prevent vessels from reaching his dock.8 In upholding
See Currie IV, supra note 1, at 497-506; Currie IH, supra note 1, at 938-56.
53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319 (1852) (upholding state regulation of pilotage); see Currie
IV, supra note 1, at 506-10.
5 See Currie IV, supra note 1, at 510-13.
8 See Pomeroy, The Power of Congress to Regulate Inter-State Commerce, 4 S.L. REV.
(n.s.) 357, 358 (1878) ("The entire subject was, for a long time, tacitly surrendered to the
domain of the individual states ....
The last fifteen years, however, have witnessed a complete revolution both in opinion and in practice.").
7 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866).
8 The year before, the Court had divided 4-4, without opinions, over the legality of a
bridge over the Hudson. The Albany Bridge Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 403 (1865), noted in 6 C.
FAmAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1971). Cooley itself
had been reaffirmed in Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1865) (Field, J.),
despite the passage of a federal statute purporting to license pilots and to replace the existing system of pilotage; over the dissents of Miller, Wayne, and Clifford, id. at 463, four
Justices concluded that the statute referred only "to pilots having charge of steamers on the
*

*
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the law,9 Justice Swayne relied principally upon Marshall's cryptic
opinion in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 10 which had
similarly permitted a state, in the absence of congressional action,
to obstruct a navigable stream. As the three dissenters in Gilman
observed, it was not at all clear that Congress had not acted.1 1
More important for present purposes, Gilman represented a significant extension of the Willson case and a sharp turn away from the
attitude apparently expressed in Cooley.
In the first place, as Clifford noted in dissent,"2 Marshall had
spoken of the creek in Willson "as a low, sluggish water, of little or
no importance, and treated the erection described in the bill of
complaint as one adapted to reclaim the adjacent marshes and as
essential to the public health"; Gilman upheld a purely commercial measure 3 obstructing what Swayne conceded to be significant
navigation. 14 Further, although Swayne, with his penchant for re-

voyage, and not to port pilots," id. at 461. Cooley was reaffirmed once more in an unduly
wordy Swayne opinion in 1872. Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872). The Kansas
Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867) (Davis, J.), and The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 761 (1867) (Nelson, J.), striking down state taxes on Indian lands shortly after
Gilman, seem, like Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), to have been based
essentially upon treaties and not upon the Indian commerce clause. For a discussion of
Worcester, see Currie III, supra note 1, at 953-56.
1 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 732.
10 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); see Currie I, supra note 1, at 946-47.
11 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 732-44 (Clifford, J., dissenting, joined by Wayne, J., and Davis,
J.). The Court had held in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), that a federal
coasting license preempted a state law giving others exclusive rights to navigate the Hudson
River. Though a similar license had been ignored in Willson, another had been one of the
grounds for the later holding that Congress had forbidden obstruction of the Ohio River.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (I), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852); see Currie IV, supra note 1, at 511-12; Currie III, supra note 1, at 941-42, 947; see also Pomeroy,
supra note 6, at 378 (finding it "difficult to reconcile" Gilman with Wheeling Bridge 1);
Wintersteen, The Commerce Clause and the State, 28 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 733, 744 (1889)
(describing Gilman as "receding" from Wheeling Bridge and praising it as "practical" because a contrary result would have deprived the states of power to "establish[] new avenues
of land ...

communication").

The license argument highlighted the standing problem that the Court resolved in favor
of the plaintiff on the authority of Wheeling Bridge I, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 722-24; although,
as argued, the wharf owners were "'not the owners of licensed coasting vessels'" nor themselves engaged in navigation, it was enough that they suffered "specific injury" from the
obstruction of the stream. Id. at 722.
22 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 743 (paraphrasing 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251-52). In fact it was Mr.
Wirt, representing the defendants, and not Marshall who had used the word "sluggish" in
describing the creek. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 249.
Is The only justification offered for the bridge in the statement of the case was that it
would "connect parts of one street ... having one part on the east and one part on the west
of the stream" and thus improve transportation by land. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 719.
14 The Schuylkill was "navigable... for vessels drawing from eighteen to twenty feet
of water," and "[c]ommerce has been carried on in all kinds of vessels for many years to and
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citing hornbook rules rather than giving reasons, 5 paraphrased
Justice Curtis's Cooley test at one point in his opinion,'16 he made
no effort to apply it to the case. If he had, he might have had difficulty explaining why the construction of bridges over navigable
waters was not a subject requiring uniformity; one might have
thought there was no more serious threat to commerce than obstructions that might prohibit the passage of vessels entirely. Yet
Swayne concluded quite implausibly and without explanation that
"[b]ridges are of the same nature with ferries" and thus fell within
the powers that Marshall had said were "'not surrendered to the
General Government.' -17 This would mean, if taken seriously, that
the states could obstruct any river they liked unless Congress had
told them not to; and that would seem to mean there was precious
little left of the Cooley doctrine. Indeed, at the end of his opinion
Swayne appeared to revert to Taney's extreme position that the
commerce clause did not limit the states at all: "Until the dormant
power of the Constitution is awakened and made effective, by appropriate legislation, the reserved power of the States is plenary
,,18

In appearing to embrace the three inconsistent positions of
Marshall, Curtis, and Taney in a single case, Swayne made clear
only that if the Court was to make sense out of the commerce
clause it would have to start assigning the opinions to someone
else; but in upholding the bridge in Gilman the Court seemed to
take a very dim view of the negative effect of the commerce clause.
B.

The Portwardens Case and Crandall v. Nevada

Within two years after Gilman, however, the Court seemed to
repudiate most of what that case stood for, without even citing it,
and to take an even more nationalistic view than that taken in
Cooley-without the dissent of Swayne or of anyone else.
The occasion was Steamship Co. v. Portwardens,9 and the
year was 1867. The opinion was delivered by Chase: Louisiana

from the complainants' property." Id. at 721.
25 Cf. Conway v. Taylor's Executor, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 603 (1862), discussed in Currie
IV, supra note 1, at 511 n.278.
1670 U.S. ( 3 Wall.) at 726-27.
17 Id.
at 726 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824)). Ferries,
unlike bridges, do not prevent the passage of other vessels.
1870 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 732; see Currie IV, supra note 1, at 499-502 (discussing the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283
(1849)).
19 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
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lacked power to impose a five-dollar tax on vessels entering the
port of New Orleans. One ground was that the law offended the
ban on "Dut[ies] of Tonnage" found in article I, section 10;20 intended to prevent evasion of the ban on import taxes, this provision had to be construed despite its narrow wording to embrace
"not only a pro rata tax. .. .but any duty on the ship" in order
to accomplish its purpose. 21 Before reaching this reasonable conclusion, however, Chase had already determined that the law also
offended the commerce clause.
The tax in question, Chase wrote, was "a regulation of commerce." 22 This conclusion itself seemed to contradict the distinction drawn by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden" and to imply, surprisingly, that the commerce clause gave Congress power to impose
taxes. Chase explained with some persuasiveness, however, that
the purpose of the clause was "to place ... commerce beyond interruption or embarrassment arising from the conflicting or hostile
State regulations" and that the tax, which imposed a "serious burden," therefore "work[ed] the very mischief against which the Constitution intended to protect commerce among the States. ' 24 This
of course could have been said with much greater force in Gilman,
where the state law had been upheld: one would have thought a
physical obstruction of navigation a far more serious "embarrassment" of commerce than a paltry five-dollar tax. 25 The Court
might have attempted to reconcile the two cases by arguing that
I, § 10.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 34-35. See also the State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
204 (1871), where, in a typically uninformative Clifford opinion, the Court unanimously held
that, although a state could impose a property tax on vessels, it could not measure the tax
by tonnage as a surrogate for value. Later cases were to take a more functional view. See,
e.g., Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877) (Strong, J.) (wharfage fee may be proportioned
to tonnage); Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 581 (1874) (Miller, J.) (tonnage
tax "a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving or departing from a port").
" 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 33.
23 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The bans on state import and tonnage taxes in U.S.
CoNsT. art. I,§ 10, Marshall argued, did not imply that otherwise the states were free to
regulate interstate commerce; for the Constitution treated the tax and commerce powers as
"distinct from each other," and the prohibitions "presuppose the existence of that which
they restrain, not of that which they do not purport to restrain." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 20103; see also Currie IV, supra note 1, at 502-06 (discussing the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283 (1849)).
" 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 33. For discussion of the purposes of the clause, see Currie HI,
supra note 1, at 944-45 n.400.
25 Money has depreciated since 1867, but the ship tax struck down in the State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 211 (1871), was one dollar per ton and thus upwards
of three hundred dollars for some vessels; those in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849), had been one to two dollars per passenger, id. at 284-85.
20 U.S. CONST. art.
21
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the whole port of New Orleans was more essential to commerce
than a few miles of the Schuylkill,2 6 but it did not do so; and thus
7
the two decisions seemed to stand the Cooley test on its head.
Even more interesting than the result, however, was the approach taken by Chase to the general question of the effect of the
commerce clause on state law. Swayne had just finished saying the
28
states retained power until Congress acted; the Chief Justice said
"the regulation of commerce among the States is in Congress"
alone2 9 with certain exceptions. The first class of exceptions included "quarantine and other health laws, laws concerning the domestic police, and laws regulating the internal trade of a State,"
which "have always been held not to be within the grant to Congress." 0 The second, exemplified by Cooley, consisted of "cases in
which, either by express provision or by omission to exercise its
own powers, Congress has left to the regulation of States matters
clearly within its commercial powers. ' 31 Finally, the charge assessed in Cooley was based "not only on State laws but upon contract," for "[p]ilotage is compensation for services performed; half
pilotage is compensation for services which the pilot has put him-"32
self in readiness to perform by labor, risk, and cost .
of an
duty
the
explaining
of
difficulty
Apart from the obvious
33
contract,
on
based
one
as
pilot
a
for
pay
to
unwilling shipowner
this statement of the law was revolutionary. Ignoring the Cooley
See T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 593 (1868) ("[T]he same structure
might constitute a material obstruction in the Ohio or the Mississippi, where vessels are
constantly passing, which would be unobjectionable on a stream which a boat only enters at
intervals of weeks or months.").
27 Marshall's familiar but questionable principle that the power to tax was the power to
destroy, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819), would have supported
the Portwardensdecision, but it would equally have outlawed the pilotage charges upheld in
Cooley. Cooley's insistence on investigating the degree of necessity for uniformity seems
hard to reconcile with a rigid rule that all taxes on commerce are forbidden. For a discussion
of McCulloch, see Currie III, supra note 1, at 934-38.
28 See supra text accompanying note 18.
29 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 34.
30 Id. at 33. These are powers "properly within State jurisdiction," which are "not af2

fected by the grant of power [to Congress] to regulate commerce," in spite of the fact that
they are powers "which may ... affect commerce." Id.
31Id.
32

Id. at 34.

"2Field, concluding in Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450, 456-57 (1865),
that repeal of a statute giving a rejected pilot half his fee did not affect rights previously
vested, had unnecessarily attempted to explain the right as quasi-contractual. Miller's answer was devastating: "Here is no element of contract; no consent of minds; no services
rendered . . . . It is purely a case of a violation of the law in refusing to perform what it
. Id. at 468 (Miller, J., dissenting).
enjoins ....
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test altogether, Chase seemed to be returning to Marshall's notion
of reserved powers, 4 with a strong and startling suggestion that
such matters as the quarantine of foreign vessels were not within
congressional cognizance at all. More important, Chase seemed to
be saying that states could regulate matters that did fall within the
commerce power only with congressional permission. This seemed
to take back Cooley's conclusion that the states were free to regulate commerce in the absence of congressional action unless the
subject demanded uniformity, 5 and it squarely contradicted Cooley's express determination that Congress could not authorize the
states to regulate commerce.3 6 Finally, Chase was the first spokesman for the Court to espouse the recurring fallacy that in some
undefined cases congressional inaction was to be treated as if it
were permissive or prohibitory legislation 7-though the Constitution makes clear that Congress can act only by affirmative vote of
both Houses. 8 Thus in two short years, without dissent and without significant changes in membership, the Court had gone from
saying the states could impede commerce unless Congress had said
otherwise to essentially the opposite position, that they could not
do so unless authorized by Congress.
Adding to the confusion was the virtually contemporaneous
decision in Crandallv. Nevada, 9 in which, while invalidating a tax
on passengers leaving the state on grounds quite difficult to discover in the Constitution, 0 all the Justices but Clifford and
Chase41 doubted there was a commerce clause violation because
the subject seemed neither "uniform" nor "national" within the
Cooley test.42 Justice Miller, who wrote the opinion, did not bother
saying why that was so or how uniformity could be the test after

See supra text accompanying notes 10-18.
3' See supra text accompanying note 4.
31 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 317 ("If the states were divested of the power to legislate on this
34

subject by the grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not
confer upon them power thus to legislate."); see Currie IV, supra note 1, at 506-10.
37 See, e.g., Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VTA.L. Rlv. 1, 5-6
(1940).
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7; see T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONsTrruTIONAL INTmRPRrATIoN 162 (1956) (describing the congressional-inaction theory as "sheer
make-believe").
3" 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 194-96.
41 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49 (Clifford, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J.). Clifford's brief
opinion was nothing but a conclusion: "the State legislature cannot impose any such burden
upon commerce among the several States." Id.
42 Id. at 43.
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what Chase had said in Portwardens,4 ' and he made no effort to
distinguish that case. There was no apparent reason to think ships
required more uniformity than trains, or commerce entering the
state more than that departing, or freight more than passengers;
the Court did not revive the rejected contention that passenger
traffic was not commerce." Indeed, by modern standards the tax in
Crandall was more offensive in commerce clause terms than that
in Portwardens, for only the former applied solely to interstate
travelers; if the purpose of the clause was, as Chase had said, to
protect interstate commerce against "interruption or embarrassment," one might have thought its most obvious effect was to protect it from outright discrimination. 5 Fortunately for consistency,
neither Miller's dicta about commerce in Crandall nor the commerce basis of Portwardenswas necessary to the result; but they
did raise a serious question whether the Court had any idea of
46
what it was doing.
C.

Woodruff v. Parham

The year after Crandall was decided, Justice Miller had another opportunity to write a narrow interpretation of the negative
effect of the commerce clause in an opinion for the Court. Alabama
had levied a tax on the sale of goods at auction, and the Court
43The one thing the two preceding decisions had had in common was Marshall's idea of
reserved state powers, which Miller did not mention.
44See Currie III, supra note 1, at 938-39 & n.369 (discussing Gibbous v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
41See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down a law forbidding the importation of most solid or liquid waste); South Carolina State Highway Dep't.
v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) (Stone, J.) ("[W]hen the regulation is of
such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative
action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted
on legislation ... ."); THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton) (describing the purpose of the
clause as being to suppress "the interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States");
L. Ta=E, AMERicAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 326 (1978) ("any state action'which imposes special or distinct burdens on out-of-state interests unrepresented in the state's political process" viewed with suspicion); cf. Currie III, supra note 1, at 934-38 (discussing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). Moreover, a tax of one dollar per passenger
seems, in Portwardens'sown terms, a more "serious burden" than one of five dollars on an
entire ship. Several Justices had pronounced a similar tax on incoming passengers from
abroad invalid on commerce clause grounds as early as 1849. See Currie IV,supra note 1, at
502-05 (discussing the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)).
48 Much later Miller himself ws to treat Crandallas if it had struck the tax down on
commerce clause grounds. See C. FARMAN, supra note 8, at 1307 n.14; see also Pomeroy,
supra note 6, at 364 (writing in 1878: "I think it very clear from later decisions that the
views of the[] dissenting judges [on the commerce issue] would now be adopted by the court
as correct.").
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upheld it as applied to goods brought in from other states and sold
in their original package. 47 Most of the opinion was devoted to a
well-written though disputable refutation of Marshall's dictum
that the import-export clause forbade state taxation of imports
from other states.4 8 In the last few paragraphs Miller also rejected
an attack based on the commerce clause.
The key to the case, in Miller's opinion, was that "[t]here is no
attempt to discriminate injuriously against the products of other
States": the tax was "imposed alike upon all sales made in Mobile,
.. . whether the goods sold are the produce of [Alabama] or some
other [state]. 14 9 A tax applicable only to out-of-state goods, he
stated flatly, would be contrary to the commerce clause.5 0 But, he
noted in connection with his import clause argument, if a state
could not subject such goods to a nondiscriminatory tax, it could
not require a merchant who bought his wares elsewhere to "con47 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869).

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 130-40 (disavowing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,
449 (1827)). Miller stressed the absence of any reference by the Framers to taxes on "imports" from other states, and correctly dismissed Marshall's statement as unexplained dictum. He reclassified Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861), which had held that a
state tax on gold shipped from California to New York offended the import-export clause, as
based on the commerce clause and on "the rule laid down in Crandall v. Nevada," 75 U.S. (8
Wall) at 138, since, as he rightly observed, the fact that the shipment was interstate and
not foreign "seems to have escaped the attention of counsel ... and of the Chief Justice
who delivered the opinion," id. at 137. See Currie IV, supra note 1, at 512. As Nelson said in
dissent, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 142-44, the words of the prohibition did not distinguish between
interstate and foreign trade, and the commerce clause expressly equated them; and there
was something to his argument that at least some of the policies underlying the imports
clause applied equally to interstate traffic, id. at 144. See Currie I, supra note 1, at 949-51;
see also T. PowELL, supra note 38, at 182 ("When the Framers spoke in 1787, the states
were substantially sovereign, and their exercises of sovereign powers in adversely affecting
trade from sister states was one of the factors leading to the Annapolis conference ....
).
In a companion case reaching the same result as Woodruff, the Court seems to have overlooked an allegation that some of the goods had come from foreign countries. Hinson v.
Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 149 (1869). See also Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872)
(Field, J.), which uncritically and unanimously followed the implications of Marshall's illconceived Brown opinion in holding the same clause forbade a nondiscriminatory property
tax on imported goods while they remained in their original package, though some of the
purposes of the clause suggested it outlawed only taxes on imports as such. See Currie I,
supra note 1, at 949-51; Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (overruling Low).
The arguably erroneous view that the imports clause barred even nondiscriminatory taxes
weighed heavily in Miller's refusal to hold that it applied to imports from other states. See
48

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 137; see also 4 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN rHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 80 (2d ed. Wash., D.C. 1836) (ist ed.
Wash., D.C. 1827-1830) (comments by Gov. Johnston indicating that at the time of the

North Carolina Ratifying Convention, some states were in fact taxing goods imported from
other states).
4 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 140.
50 Id.
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tribute a dollar to support its government, improve its thoroughfares or educate its children." 51 Miller seemed to be suggesting, as
counsel had argued, that "it would be strange" if the Constitution
required the state "to work a discrimination against its own manufacturers. ' 52 All of this must strike a responsive chord in the modern reader, for much of what Miller said about the commerce
clause in Woodruff has survived: discrimination is almost always
contrary to the clause, 5 3 but interstate commerce may be required
to pay its way.54
Shaken from his usual lethargy, Justice Nelson dissented
alone, making the intelligent objection that a ban on discrimination was not enough to protect producers in other states: a New
York tax on "all sales of cotton, tobacco, or rice. . . would be a tax
without any discrimination; and yet it would be in fact, in its operation and effect, exclusively upon these Southern products."5' 5
There is a sense, of course, in which such a tax could be found
discriminatory; as Nelson's example portended, the Court has not
found discrimination a self-defining concept in later cases.5
What is most interesting about Woodruff is once again the
Court's treatment of prior law. Miller's discrimination principle
would appear to mean that the Court was wrong to rely on the
commerce clause in Portwardens,where the tax evidently applied
to ships entering the port from other places in the same state; 57 yet
Portwardenswas nowhere cited, nor were any of the other recent
commerce clause cases. Miller elected to write as if the case before
him were the first in which the Court had had occasion to develop
a theory of the effect of the clause on state law. Most jarringly, the

51

Id. at 137.

Id. at 128 (Mr. Phillips). Marshall's reasoning in McCulloch, though not the absolute
rule Marshall laid down in that case, also supports Miller's distinction: when a legislature
can harm disfavored interests only by inflicting similar burdens on its own favorites, the
political process provides its own check on arbitrary action. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428, 435
52

(1819).
See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
" See, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
45 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 145-46.
16 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding a law
forbidding refiners to operate retail service stations though no gasoline was refined in Maryland); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding
discriminatory a law requiring that all apples sold bear their federal grade or none at all,
because the enacting state had no grading system of its own); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating as discriminatory a requirement that milk be processed
within five miles of the place of sale, though the rule excluded milk from elsewhere in the
same state as well).
" See supra text accompanying notes 19-38.
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test he enunciated was a brand-new one that seemed to depart
from all of the inconsistent theses that had been espoused in the
past five years without even adverting to them. In a companion
case5" he attempted to show that he was really applying the Cooley
test, which he had embraced in Crandall;59 but by saying that discrimination and nothing else brought state legislation within the
requirement of national uniformity he really appeared to be using
the familiar formula as a cover for an entirely new approach. The
pretense seemed certain to produce confusion in future cases as to
whether the need for uniformity or discrimination or both was the
constitutional test.
D. Railroad Taxes
Justice Miller's conclusion in Woodruff that discrimination
was the key to the validity of state laws affecting commerce proved
as fleeting as it was novel. Within four years the Court was to
strike down one nondiscriminatory tax on commerce clause
grounds,60 and Miller was to complain because it refused to strike
down another.61
Pennsylvania had imposed two taxes on railroads doing business within its borders: a flat charge of two to five cents per ton of
freight carried anywhere in Pennsylvania,"2 and a levy of 0.75 % of
the gross receipts of railroads incorporated there."8 To Justices
Swayne and Davis, both taxes were constitutional as applied to interstate shipments and their proceeds: as they said of the freight
tax, neither discriminated against interstate commerce," and that
should have sufficed under Woodruff-which they did not cite.
The majority, however, held the first charge unconstitutional
in the Case of the State Freight Tax"' in 1873-apparently the
first time that any state law had been struck down solely on commerce clause grounds.66 Since interstate freight carriage was interstate commerce, Justice Strong wrote, the freight tax regulated in5

Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8Wall.) 148, 152 (1869).

"0 See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
40 Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
41 State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1873).
92 Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 232-33.
6S State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284, 284-85 (1873).
" Id. at 282.
*' 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
"See Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 365 ("Few more important decisions have been made
concerning the regulation of commerce since the leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden.").
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terstate commerce;e 7 if a state could impose a two-cent tax it could
impose a prohibitive one;68 and interstate transportation was a
subject-unlike the construction of bridges over local streams in
Gilmane-requiring uniform regulation. 0 In support of these conclusions Strong relied on Crandall and another decision striking
down a state tax without invoking the commerce clause7 1 and ignored the one precedent in his favor: the opinion against the ship
tax in Portwardens.
Cooley,7 3 the source of the uniformity test professedly applied,
was also not cited-perhaps because it would have been difficult to
reconcile with the decision that the freight tax was invalid. Not
only could it have been argued with as much force that the power
to charge pilot fees was also the power to destroy;74 interstate
transportation had been the "subject" of state law in Cooley in exactly the same sense as it was in the Freight Tax Case. If nothing
else, it had become evident that under the Cooley test everything
depended on how the relevant "subject" was defined, and that the
Court was prepared to define it inconsistently and without explanation. No effort was made to distinguish Woodruff either. Without attribution, the majority pooh-poohed its discrimination principle by begging the question: "if an act to tax interstate or foreign
67

82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 275-76.

68 Id. at 276. In contrast to the opinion in Portwardens,Strong did not bother describing the burden actually imposed as a "serious" one. See supra text accompanying note 24.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 8-19.
70 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 279-80. Strong noted once again that the stream in Gilman had
been "wholly within a [single] State" and, like Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), speculated that perhaps the states had no power to regulate interstate
commerce as such at all: "Cases that have sustained State laws, alleged to be regulations of
commerce among the States, have been such as related to bridges or dams across streams
wholly within a State, police or health laws, or subjects of a kindred nature, not strictly
commercial regulations." 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 279.
71 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 280-81. That the privilege of traveling to the seat of government
recognized in Crandall,infra text accompanying notes 167-69, applied to the shipment of
freight everywhere in the country seems questionable, and the Crandall opinion seemed to
suggest that even a discriminatory tax would not offend the commerce clause. See supra
text accompanying notes 39-45. The other case cited was Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 169 (1861), which had been based on the import-export clause, and reexplained on
commerce clause grounds in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 137-38. See supra
note 48.
71 Strong argued that the tax was indistiguishable from a tariff on the entry and exit of
goods from the state, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 276; but a tariff applies only to incoming commerce, while the freight tax was even-handed.
73 See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
7" See Greeley, What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce? 1
H Rv. L. REV. 159, 181 (1887) (pointing out that Strong's argument was enough to outlaw
any state measure affecting interstate or foreign commerce).
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commerce is unconstitutional, it is not cured by including
75
State.
the
of
domain
the
within
subjects
provisions
In a second opinion by Strong, immediately following, the
Court upheld the second Pennsylvania tax in the case of the State
Tax on Railway Gross Receipts. 7 Unlike the freight tax, this one
was said to fall upon railroad property-its money-rather than on
the transportation of freight, and thus, although its effect on interstate commerce might be the same as that of the freight tax, it was
not a regulation of commerce at all." A more sterile distinction can
scarcely be imagined: if the Framers meant to protect commerce
from interference, as Strong had said in the Freight-Tax Case,7
one would think the effect rather than the form of the exaction
79
decisive.
75 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 277. The intervening decision in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168 (1869) (Field, J.) (alternative holding); see also infra text accompanying notes
163, 182, which allowed a state to discriminate against foreign insurance corporations, suggests a possible distinction: if a foreign insurer's agreement is not an interstate transaction
because both parties signed it in the same state, perhaps the sale of goods after their importation is not either. But to hold that the tax in Woodruff was not a regulation of interstate
commerce would seem to suggest that a discriminatorytax on the sale of out-of-state goods
would also pass muster; and that would seem squarely contrary to the purpose of the clause.
In light of future developments it is noteworthy that the Court in the Freight Tax Case
treated as part of interstate commerce a rail journey that began and ended within a single
state-where the freight was then taken out of the state by ship. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 234.
The point passed without discussion. Marshall had said in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824), that Congress's power extended to those parts of an interstate trip
within a single state, but the Freight Tax case was an extension of his conclusion; for in
Gibbons the entire journey had taken place in the same vessel.
76 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1873).
77 Id. at 294-95. For a thorough exploration of the later history of the formalistic distinctions made by Strong in these cases, see Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal
Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States (pt. 2), 31 HA.v. L. REV. 572 (1918). For
criticism, see part 5 of the same article, 32 HARv. L. Rav. 234, 244 (1919) (noting that in
these and other early cases the Justices "were prone to indulge in nominalism and conceptualism in finding what was the subject taxed" and "seemed to be feeling their way in the
dark").
78 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 275.
79 See Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE (A. Tarlock, ed. 1981) (terming the distinction "bizarre").
Kitch argues that in terms of effects the freight tax was indeed the less harmful to interstate commerce: "the flat tax on freight per pound weighed more heavily on the short haul,
largely intrastate, traffic while the gross receipts tax directly taxed that portion of the revenue derived from the out-of-state haul." Id. at 28. The Court's formal distinction was made
to appear still more inexplicable by Strong's insistence that, although the freight tax was
nominally levied upon the railroads, in "practical operation" its "burden" could be passed
on to the shipper. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 272-75; cf. id. at 294 (defending the gross receipts
tax: "A tax upon the occupation of a physician . . . measured by.. . income . . . will
hardly be claimed to be a tax on his patients. . . , though the burden ultimately falls upon
them."). On Strong's behalf it should be said, as he noted, that a similarly formalistic distinction had been drawn in determining whether states could impose taxes based upon the
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Miller made this objection in his dissent in the Gross Receipts
case, and Field and Hunt joined him.Y What was interesting about
Miller's position was the facile way in which he abandoned all he
had said about the commerce clause in Woodruff v. Parham.There
he had said a tax on out-of-state goods was permissible because
not discriminatory;8 ' here he said interstate commerce was "exempted . . . from [state] . . .control" entirely.82 In Woodruff he

had said interstate commerce must pay its fair share of the cost of
government; 3 in the Gross Receipts case he said (in italics) that
"by no device or evasion.

. .

can a State compel citizens of other

States to pay to it a tax, contribution,or toll, for the privilege of
having their goods transported through that State."'" Miller's
principle was, as usual, clear and simple; the only trouble was that
he kept enunciating different principles every time a new case
came along.
There is one passage in the Freight Tax Case that suggests
why the Court properly concluded that nondiscrimination alone
would not be enough to assure interstate traffic an equal opportunity; and, although the argument was not carried through, it points
toward a possible basis for legitimately distinguishing between the
two railroad taxes:
It is of national importance that.., there should be but one
regulating power, for if one State can .. . tax persons or
property passing through it, . . . every other may, and thus

commercial intercourse between States remote from each
other may be destroyed. .

.

. [Flor though it might bear the

imposition of a single tax, it would be crushed under the load
85

of many.

In other words, since the freight tax was not apportioned to the
length of travel, cumulative burdens imposed by several states on
value of federal government securities. See 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 272 ("IT]he decisions
turned upon the question, what was the subject of the tax .....
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 298.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50, 53-54.
82 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 299.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 136-37.
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 299. The Court conceded in the Freight Tax Case that a state
could charge a fee for the actual use of its own facilities, such as a toll road or canal, but
properly concluded that no such facilities were involved in the case of a privately owned
railroad. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 277-79. Miller also acknowledged in the Gross Receipts case
that the state could impose a property tax on the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 299; he did not explain how this concession was to be squared with his
theory.
85 82 U.S. (15. Wall.) at 280.
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the same shipment-even though not discriminatory-could have
placed interstate traffic at a competitive disadvantage by subjecting it alone to multiple exactions.8 6 Unlike the freight tax, however, the gross-receipts provision applied only to Pennsylvania corporations; if each state taxed only its own companies, there was no
risk of multiple taxation. Thus the result of the two railroad decisions can be reconciled if one assumes, as the Court would actually
7
later hold, that no other state could tax the same gross receipts;
but Strong nowhere suggested that this was the basis of his
distinction."
The circle was closed by Chase's 1873 opinion for a unanimous
Court in Osborne v. Mobile,"9 upholding a tax that not only posed
84

See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938); L.

TRmE,

supra note 45, at 360-69; Note, The Multiple Burden Theory in Interstate Commerce Taxation, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1940). Professor Powell remarks:
If we discard all the doctrinal disquisitions of the opinions and look only to the results
of the decisions, we find that the controlling motive of the Supreme Court has been the
desire to prevent the states from imposing on interstate commerce any peculiar or unusual burden ....
What the court is insistent upon is that there must be adequate
safeguards against subjecting interstate commerce to heavier taxation than local
commerce.
Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States
(pt. 7), 32 HARv. L. REv. 902, 917-18 (1919). The tax in Portwardens,see supra text accompanying notes 19-46, which the Court also struck down, posed the same risk of multiple
burdens. Of course the Court might have insisted upon a showing that other states actually
did tax the same transaction. See L. TRmE, supra note 45, at 360 (citing General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964)). A freight tax proportioned to miles traveled
would have avoided this possibility, see L. TRmE, supra note 45, at 367-69, and cases cited;
yet Strong's blunderbuss opinion seemed to mean that such a tax would be unconstitutional
too--though he did note that the tax in question was not so proportioned, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
at 273, 278.
67 Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887) (Miller, J.) (invalidating a gross-receipts tax
on out-of-state corporations, even though apportioned to their local earnings). Even before
the first Gross Receipts decision the Court had similarly held, without explicitly invoking
the commerce clause, that ships could be subjected to property taxes only in their home
port, Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (7 How.) 596 (1855), cited in Currie IV, supra
note 1, at 512; and it soon wrote this distinction into the commerce clause itself, Morgan v.
Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471, 479 (1873) (Hunt, J.). As later cases have suggested, there
may be more equitable formulas for apportioning the power to tax interstate operations
among the states affected. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); L.
TRmE, supra note 45, at 367-69.
" Strong did indicate his awareness that the tax reached only domestic corporations;
an alternative basis for upholding the tax was that it was laid on the franchise granted by
Pennsylvania. 82 U.S. (15 WalL) at 296 ("It is not to be questioned that the States may tax
the franchises of companies created by them. . . ."). Ironically, the Gross Receipts decision
was overruled shortly after the Court had demonstrated, by precluding taxation by other
states, supra note 87, that there was ample justification for the distinction Justice Strong
had originally drawn. Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887) (per
Bradley, J., who had been with the majority in the original Gross Receipts case).
" 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 479 (1873).
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a patent risk of multiple taxation but actually discriminated
against interstate commerce as well.90 Miller held his peace; apparently discrimination, which in Woodruff he had said was determinative, was no longer either necessary or sufficient to show
invalidity.91
Chase's death spares us from pursuing the saga further in this
article; his successor was left with precedents reflecting just about
every conceivable view of the commerce clause problem. The overall tendency of commerce clause decisions during Chase's time
seemed lenient. The only measures struck down were the taxes on
arriving ships and on interstate freight; the states were apparently
free to obstruct navigable rivers and even to discriminate against
interstate operations, so long as they did not make the mistake of
labeling a tax as one on interstate commerce itself.2 In doctrinal
terms the Court's efforts in this field can be described only as a
disaster.9 3

II. THE CrIL-WAR

AMENDMENTS

The thirteenth amendment,9 4 abolishing slavery, was proclaimed law in 1865; the fourteenth,9 5 extending citizenship to

7

" The city imposed a license tax of $50 on express companies operating only within the
city, of $100 on those operating only within the state, and of $500 on those "having a business extending beyond the limits of the State." Id. at 480. Like the gross-receipts tax, wrote
Chase, this exaction fell upon "a business carried on" in the state; it was immaterial that the
business in question included "the making of contracts... for... transportation beyond
it" or that it might" "increase the cost of transportation. . . ."' Id. at 482-83. The Court
added that there was no discrimination against citizens of other states-proving there was
no violation of the privileges and immunities clause but ignoring Woodruff's distinct principle forbidding discrimination against interstate commerce itself. Id. at 481-82.
,1See also Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 432 (1871) (Bradley, J., concurring) (arguing that a state tax on sales by sample would violate the commerce clause even if
it applied equally to local sellers, since it would "effectually" require foreign manufacturers
to "establish[] commercial houses" within the state). This rather extreme view was to become an alternative holding in Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489 (1887), written by
Bradley himself. In Ward the Court found a discrimination against outsiders in violation of
article IV. See infra text accompanying note 185.
"2 See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsToRY 626 (rev. ed. 1926)
(until the Freight Tax Case, in this period "only a few interstate commerce cases had been
considered, but in each the Court had taken a pronounced stand in favor of State
regulation").
93 In his classic study of early commerce clause decisions, Professor Frankfurter passed
over the entire Chase period, observing that Chase's contribution "consists in the main of
fugitive and confused themes in the Supreme Court's symphonic evolution of the commerce
clause." F. FRANKFURTER, Tan COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WArrE 74
(1937).
94 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
95 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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blacks and protecting them against official discrimination, in 1868;
the fifteenth," giving them the vote, in 1870. Beginning in 1866,
Congress, on the strength of these provisions, enacted a series of
statutes designed to make the vision of equality concrete.9 7 These
statutes were to engage the Court's most serious attention shortly
after Chase's death. But in the meantime, in two historic cases in
1873, the Court was asked for the first time to interpret the
amendments themselves.
The critical decision came in a case remote from the amendments' central purpose of racial justice.9 8 Louisiana had given a
partial monopoly of the slaughtering business to one company;99 its
competitors argued that this created an "involuntary servitude,"
abridged their "privileges or immunities," denied them "equal protection of the laws," and "deprived" them of "liberty, or property,
without due process of law," in violation of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments. By a bare majority,1 00 the Court rejected
all four objections in an opinion by Justice Miller.
The thirteenth amendment contention was nothing but a play
on words: the whole tenor of the congressional debate confirms
that, as Miller said, "servitude" was included to prevent evasion of
the ban on slavery, not to forbid limitations on the right to use
one's property. 10 1 In light of later developments, it is noteworthy
that the equal protection and due process arguments were given
equally short shrift.
First, since the purpose of the former clause was to set aside
laws discriminating against blacks, the Court "doubt[ed] very

" U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
" See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, repealed
by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, repealed
by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36; Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140,
repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36, 37; Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27. The decisions involving these statutes, with other cases of the Waite period, will be the
subject of the final chapters of this study in book form.
'0 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The background of the litigation is described in detail in C. FAImAN, supra note 8, at 1301-88.
" As the Court emphasized, the statute did not forbid others to do their own slaughtering; it required them to do it on the company's premises and to pay a fee for the privilege.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 42, 61.
100 Field's dissent, 83 U.S. at 83, was joined by Chase, Bradley, and Swayne; the last
two added dissenting opinions of their own. Id. at 83, 111, 124.
1*1Id. at 68-69; see Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (upholding, on the
basis of the thirteenth amendment, a federal statute outlawing peonage); CON. GLOBE, 38th
Cong. passim (1864-65). Field gave the thirteenth amendment argument a glance by suggesting that a person excluded from an occupation was not truly free, but he fell short of
resting his dissent on that provision. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 89-93.
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much whether any action ... not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
would ever be held to come within the purview of this provision."10 2 This might have been a plausible enough holding if documented, as I shall discuss below;10 3 but it was not the holding.
Miller expressly reserved the question of nonracial discrimination
until "some case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice in
its courts," was presented'° 4-leaving the reader with the bare conclusion that Slaughter-House was not such a case and with no immediate clue as to why he thought the clause applied only to injus105
tices committed in the courts.
The due process discussion was even more perfunctory: the
fourteenth amendment provision subjected the states to the same
limitations to which the fifth subjected the federal government;
and
under no construction of that provision that we have ever
seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their
trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision.1 0
Miller did not even say whether he meant that there had been no
deprivation or that the rights involved were not property, let alone
explain what he thought either "deprivation" or "property" meant.
There is language in the context of an earlier and apparently gratuitous discussion of the scope of Louisiana's police power' 0 7 that
suggests he thought there had been no deprivation; 0 8 but, unlike
102

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.

103 See infra text accompanying notes 115-21.
104 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81. During oral argument in a later railroad case, Miller emphatically denied that he had meant in Slaughter-House to limit the clause to the protection of blacks. See C. FAiRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at
187 (1939).
10' Bradley concluded, without giving reasons, that the law denied equal protection, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) at 122; the other dissenters relied on other provisions.
106 Id. at 81.
107 After giving examples of British monopolies, explaining that limiting the place and
manner of slaughtering was a standard means of combating nuisances, and invoking McCulloch v. Maryland's test for the necessity and propriety of federal laws, see Currie III, supra
note 1, at 929-32, Miller concluded that Louisiana's "authority. . . to pass the present statute is ample," unless there was something to the contrary in either the state or the federal
constitution. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66. Why he thought the Supreme Court had power to
determine anything beyond the federal question when reviewing a state-court judgment he
did not say.
108 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 61-62 (denying that the complaining butchers had been
"deprived of the right to labor" or that the law "seriously interfere[d]" with their business).
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later Justices, he nowhere attempted to tie his police power discussion to the due process clause, and he did not even cite the Court's
recent declaration in the Legal Tender Cases'0 9 that the clause applied "only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power." 0 Finally, the
statement that the Court had "[n]ever seen" a construction of the
clause that would invalidate the monopoly was not easy to take at
face value, since both Taney in Dred Scott"' and Chase in the repudiated Hepburn v. Griswold" 2 had employed due process to
strike down federal statutes in what arguably were analogous circumstances; some explanation
of what the clause did mean seems
3
to have been in order."
The bulk of both the majority and dissenting opinions, however, was devoted to the question whether the monopoly offended
the provision that "no State shall. . . abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."I" Miller's negative answer was simply stated: the introductory clause of the amendment
spoke separately of state and of national citizenship; therefore the
privileges and immunities of "citizens of the United States" were
those "belonging to a citizen of the United States as such," not
those enjoyed by virtue of state citizenship."15 From this critical
conclusion the result followed easily: unlike rights secured by federal treaties or by the thirteenth amendment, the right to slaugh109

See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 183.

110 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1872).

m Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see Currie V, supra note 1, at 726-38.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 174-85.
M'Both Bradley and Swayne invoked due process. The former announced that the
"right of choice" of profession was "liberty" and the "occupation" itself "property," 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) at 122, the latter that "liberty" meant "freedom from all restraints but such as
are justly imposed by law" and that "property" embraced anything with "exchangeable
value," including labor, id. at 127. Neither gave reasons. Both neglected to reveal why there
was a "deprivation," and Bradley made no effort to explain why "due process of law" was
wanting. Swayne seemed to contradict his own conclusions by proclaiming, once more without argument, that the phrase meant "the application of the law as it exists in the fair and
regular course of administrative procedure." Id. Interestingly in light of his later opinions,

e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (dissenting opinion), Field's dissent did not
invoke due process.

Swayne added that "[n]o searching analysis [was] necessary to eliminate [sic] the meaning" of the first section of the fourteenth amendment; there was "no room for construction"
because its language was "intelligible and direct." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 126. Said Fairman:
"This throws more light upon Justice Swayne than upon the Amendment." C.

FAIIMAN,

supra note 8, at 1363.
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
115 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73-75. For an approving view based solely on the text of the
amendment, see A.
(1935).

McLAUGHLIN,

A

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

729

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:329

ter animals did not "owe [its] existence to the Federal government,
its National character, its Constitution, or its laws," and thus was
not a privilege of national citizenship. 116
The difficulty, of course, was with Miller's apparent conclusion
that the sole office of the clause was to protect rights already given
by some other federal law. Apart from the amendment's less than
conclusive reference to dual citizenship, 117 his sole justification was
that a broader holding would "radically change[] the whole theory
of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other
and of both these governments to the people"'s-which quite arguably was precisely what the authors of the amendment had in
mind." 9 The dissenters did not hesitate to argue that Miller's interpretation wrote the privileges or immunities clause entirely out
of the Constitution. 20 Though Miller disdained to cite it, there was
nevertheless some legislative history to support the view that the
clause created no new rights. Moreover, the dissenters overstated
their objection, since the fifth section of the amendment gave Congress explicit authority to pass legislation to enforce the rights it
protected, and it was not clear that Congress had previously had
such power with regard to some of the federal rights identified in
I'83

U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79-80. Other examples of privileges of national citizenship

given by Miller were habeas corpus, the right to travel on federal government business recognized in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); see infra text accompanying
notes 194-96, and "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances."
Id. at 79.
117 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; see 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73-74. The most obvious explanation of this
language was that it was meant to overturn Chief Justice Taney's conclusion in Dred Scott
that even free blacks were not state citizens entitled to invoke the diversity jurisdiction, see
Currie V, supra note 1, at 728, not to limit the scope of the privileges or immunities clause.
Indeed the citizenship clause was added long after the inclusion of the protection of privileges and immunities. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286, 2869, 2890 (1866).
118 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
I" See J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 185,
204 (1951).
120 If this inhibition . . .only refers . . . to such privileges and immunities as were
before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as
belonging to citizens of the Ufiited States, it was a vain and idle enactment ....
With
privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such
interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States
always controlled any State legislation of that character.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J., and Swayne & Bradley,
JJ.); see also J. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST 22 (1980); C. FAIRMAN, supra note 8, at 1354;
L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 423-24.
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the debate as intended to be protected.121
There was also, however, legislative history to support no
fewer than three other interpretations of the privileges or immunities clause, all of which were put forward by the dissenting Justices. In presenting the proposal to the Senate, Senator Howard
had said among other things that it was designed, as Justice Black
later argued, 22 to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states.1 23 Still other passages in the debates seemed to suggest that
Congress meant to give federal protection to all privileges or immunities that were "fundamental" in the sense described by Justice Washington in his famous circuit court interpretation, in
Corfield v. Coryell, 24 of the privileges and immunities clause of
25 Finally, numerous legislators suggested that the prinarticle IV.M
121See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2542-43 (remarks of Rep. Bingham)
(arguing that the amendment "takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it" but
merely authorized Congress for the first time to protect federal rights against state abridgement), 2961 (remarks of Sen. Poland) (arguing that it merely gave Congress power to enforce the privileges and immunities clause of article IV: "State legislation was allowed to
override it, and as no express power was by the Constftution granted to Congressto enforce
it, it became really a dead letter."). Contrast the express authority of Congress to enforce
the full faith and credit clause of the same article. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. That Congress
had been held to have implicit power to enforce the adjacent fugitive slave provision, see
Currie V, supra note 1, at 700-05 (discussing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539
(1842)), does not detract from the clearly expressed desires of Bingham and Poland to avoid
any doubt of congressional enforcement authority.
2I E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
... CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (summarizing the Bill of Rights,
noting its inapplicability to the states, and declaring it "[t]he great object of the first section
of this amendment. . . to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to
respect these great fundamental guarantees."); see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
71-72, 93-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 360-64 (1892)
(Field, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting); Crosskey, CharlesFairman,"Legislative History," and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHi. L. Rav. 1, 6 (1954). It is not entirely clear that
Justice Miller rejected the incorporation theory in Slaughter-House; indeed Professor Ely
takes Miller's inclusion of the right to assemble and petition the Government among the
privileges of national citizenship, see supra note 116, as indicating that the Court actually
embraced incorporation. J. ELY, supra note 120, at 196-97. Miller's reference is ambiguous;
he may have meant only that the states were forbidden to interfere with citizens assembling
to petition the federal government, and he conspiciously neglected to refer to the Bill of
Rights as a whole.
I' 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
123E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard)
(quoting from Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. at 551-52); see 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 114-19
(Bradley, J., dissenting); United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No.
15,282) (Woods, J.); cf. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come
Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 419 (arguing for a modified version of the fundamental rights view). Ely finds
the most plausible interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be, as it
must be, the one suggested by its language-that it was a delegation to future constitu-
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cipal aim of the amendment was to provide a firm constitutional
basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866,126 which had outlawed racially discriminatory state action.1 27 As Field said in dissent, what
article IV
did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States, the fourteenth amendment does for the protection of every citizen of
the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, whether they reside in the
same or in different States.1 28
The textual difficulty with the incorporation theory pointed
out by the second Justice Harlan 129 seems less compelling than
Professor Fairman's demonstration that nobody thought the
amendment invalidated the numerous provisions permitting trials
for infamous crimes without indictment that were adopted by
states and approved by Congress shortly after its adoption, and
that Senator Howard's interpretation was apparently shared by
virtually none of the many others who spoke to the clause in the
debates.1 30 The fundamental-rights notion reflects once again the
tional decision-makers to protect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least
not exhaustively, nor even in any specific way gives directions for finding.
J. ELY, supra note 120, at 28-30.
126 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
127 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens), 2465
(remarks of Rep. Thayer), 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall), 2502 (remarks of Rep. Raymond), 2511 (remarks of Rep. Eliot), 2538 (remarks of Rep. Rogers), 2896 (remarks of Sens.
Doolittle, Fessenden, and Howard); see also 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
18 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 100-01.
129 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 179 n.9 (1968) (dissenting opinion) ("The great
words of the four clauses of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been
an exceedingly peculiar way to say that 'The rights heretofore guaranteed against federal
intrusion by the first eight Amendments are henceforth guaranteed against state intrusion
as well.' "). If one wishes to be technical, it is hard to see how a state could "abridge" the
privileges in the Bill of Rights, since the only rights there confirmed were of freedom from
federal action. See A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 115, at 730-31 & n.18. But see Crosskey's
observation that the first amendment demonstrated it was not unusual "to forbid the
'abridging' . . . of a 'right' not previously existing against the agency forbidden, and not
formally created against it in the prohibition itself": for the "'right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government,"' which Congress was forbidden to abridge,
"did not exist previously against Congress.... ." 2 W. CROSSKY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1094 (1953).
130 Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949). The existence of the due process clause in the amendment provides another argument against incorporation; it suggests that when the drafters of the amendment
meant to make bill of rights provisions apply to the states, they said so. The later argument
that the due process clause incorporates the Bill of Rights is even more questionable, for it
makes all the other provisions of the original bill redundant. Moreover, the incorporation
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incessant quest for the judicial holy grail; perhaps at long last we
have discovered a clause that lets us strike down any law we do not
like.13 1 There is no textual reason why the clause could not have
created a new and undefined class of federal privileges, and if that
is what the framers meant to do it is no objection that they may
have misunderstood what Justice Washington was talking about on
circuit, or that he may have misunderstood article IV.'32
The basic objection to the fundamental-rights argument, as
well as to Miller's interpretation and to the incorporation thesis, is
that none of them may reflect what most of the framers actually
had in mind. The dominant theme in the debates, as Fairman has
shown,1 3 was to provide a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which provided that all persons
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery
or involuntary servitude, . . . shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
3
notwithstanding.1 '
There is no doubt what this statute was: a simple prohibition of
state racial discrimination. It created no substantive federal rights,
however fundamental; it did not make the Bill of Rights apply to
thesis would probably have been of no use to those challenging the monopoly in SlaughterHouse itself, for it is hard to find anything in the first eight amendments that forbids monopolies-unless it be the due process clause itself, which the fourteenth amendment expressly made applicable to the states without the need of incorporation.
131 Cf. Currie VI, supra note 1, at 174-85 (discussing Hepburn v. Griswold, 72 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603 (1870)).
132 The Court had made clear before the fourteenth amendment debates that the original privileges and immunities clause was merely a protection of outsiders from discrimination in respect to privileges created by state law; Washington held, despite some loose language, that it gave no protection even where there was discrimination unless the right was
fundamental. See Fairman, supra note 130, at 9-15; Currie V, supra note 1, at 698-700 (discussing Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1856)).
122 See Fairman, supra note 130, passim.
124 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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the states. But it did more than enforce rights already existing; it
provided that the rights that states chose to give white people were
the measure of the rights of nonwhites too.
Speaker after speaker proclaimed that it was this statute for
which the fourteenth amendment would provide an unassailable
constitutional base. 3 5 If the language actually adopted did not permit such an interpretation, such statements could not alter its
meaning. But a comparison of the amendment with the statute
shows that the text is admirably designed to accomplish just what
the speakers said it would do.
The statute did three things. First, it extended citizenship
without regard to race; this provision was essentially copied into
the first clause of the amendment. Second, the statute forbade racial discrimination with respect to certain enumerated rights: to
contract, to sue, to deal with property; and at the end it forbade
racial discrimination in the infliction of punishment. The second
clause of the fourteenth amendment seems to generalize these provisions: all legal privileges and immunities are protected-not only
the privileges of contracting and suing, and not only the immunity
from punishment. 136 That the provision is merely a guarantee of
equal treatment is strongly suggested by the choice of the language
of article IV, which the Court had already so construed: as Field
said, 137 the original Constitution forbade discrimination against
citizens of other states;13 8 the new provision, like the statute it was

5

See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, ch. 2 (1977); 5 C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 415 (1974); supra note 127; see also Fairman,

supra note 130, passim. Fairman concludes, nevertheless, that "Justice Cardozo's gloss on
the due process clause-what is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'-comes as close
as one can to catching the vague aspirations that were hung upon the privileges and immunities clause." Fairman, supra note 130, at 139 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)); see also Royall, The FourteenthAmendment, 4 S.L. REv. 558, 571 (1878) (arguing that the fourteenth amendment incorporated, and did not merely make constitutional,
statutes such as the Civil Rights Bill).
136 Berger denies that there was any generalization: the privileges and immunities protected were only those listed in the Civil Rights Act. R. BERGER, supra note 135, at 36.
There seems no reason to doubt, however, that the Framers meant to employ the term as
broadly as it had been construed in article IV. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 456
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (declaring that the term included all rights that were
"fundamental").
'37 See supra text accompanying note 128.
13' See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (dictum); Conner v. Elliott, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 591, 594 (1856), discussed in Currie V, supra note 1, at 698-700; see also
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430-32 (1871) (Clifford, J.) (striking down a tax
that discriminated against citizens of other states). It is worth noting Miller's own explanation of the article IV provision in Slaughter-House itself:
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as
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meant to sustain, extended the same protection to a state's own
citizens-without regard to race."3 9
It may be objected that Field's interpretation cannot be accepted because it makes the equal protection clause redundant; 14 0
every student knows that the latter clause does precisely what
Field said was done by privileges or immunities. 141 The text of the
statute the amendment was designed to justify once again suggests
an answer. The third feature of the 1866 act was to give to nonwhites "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."1 4 2 As Miller recognized in the introductory part of his
Slaughter-House opinion, there were two distinct problems with
which the mere abolition of slavery did not deal: the southern
states had adopted Black Codes denying blacks a variety of privileges and immunities, and "[ilt was said that their lives were at the
mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their protection
were insufficient or were not enforced. 1 43 Against this background
equal protection seems to mean that the states must protect blacks
to the same extent that they protect whites: by punishing those
who do them injury.14 4 "Protection of the laws" is, after all, a pecuyou grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose
restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of
the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77; accord 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 71 (1st ed. New
York 1826); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES § 1800
(Boston 1833).
13' See Crosskey, supra note 123, at 7-9 (agreeing that this was the purpose of the
amendment but arguing that it was accomplished by the equal protection clause, not by the
clause repeating the terms of article IV that the framers meant to amend); for further elaboration, see 2 W. CROSSKY supra note 129, at 1083-1158. Ely concurs: "[T]he slightest attention to language will indicate that it is the Equal Protection Clause that follows the command of equality strategy, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause proceeds by purporting
to extend to everyone a set of entitlements." J. ELY, supra note 120, at 24. Ely adds, fairly
enough, that statements indicating a desire for equality or an intention to justify the 1866
act are not necessarily inconsistent with a desire to confer additional rights as well. Id. at
23, 199. As indicated in the text, I think the language of the amendment, in light of its
origins, also cuts in favor of Field's interpretation.
10 See J. ELY, supra note 120, at 24.
141 E.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (equal access to public
education).
24 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14, Stat. 27, 27.
140 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70.
144 Compare the remarks of Senator Cowan, discussing the definition of citizenship:
Even the foreigner, while not a citizen, "is entitled, to a certain extent, to the protection of
the laws. You cannot murder him with impunity. . . .You cannot commit an assault and
battery upon him .... He has a right to the protection of the laws." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866). Blackstone speaks of protection of the laws in a similar fashion:
"For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no
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liar way to express a general freedom from discrimination; it may
well have been the privileges or immunities clause instead that was
meant to protect blacks' rights to contract, to sue, and to hold
property.
The next objection to Field's position is that the privileges or
immunities clause cannot possibly have been an anti-discrimination provision because it is too broad; since it is not confined to
racial discrimination, it would mean that the state could not bar
two-year-olds from driving trucks or halfwits from teaching school.
This objection, it will be noted, is just as applicable to the equal
protection clause, which the Court has used for the same purpose;
the Court has dealt with it, as Field did,'4 5 essentially by saying
the intention was not to outlaw reasonable classifications.' 4 An alternative construction that takes no greater liberties with the text
seems to correspond much better with its expressed purpose: despite the broad drafting, privileges or immunities are secured only
against racial discrimination, for that was the only thing forbidden
by the statute whose constitutionality the amendment was meant
14 7

to assure.

method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongly withheld or invaded. This is
what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law." 1 W. BLAcKsToNa,
COMMENTARiES *55-56; see also J. TENBROEK, supra note 103, at 26-29, 96-98, 163-79, 192221 (arguing that "equal protection" had been used in this sense ever since the earliest days
of abolitionism and not in the sense of improper classifications); cf. Willing, Protection by
Law Enforcement: The Emerging ConstitutionalRight, 35 RTrrGERs L. Rav. 1, 60 (1982)
(even in the traditional terms of Slaughter-House,preservation of effective law enforcement
when a state fails to provide it is a "right" guaranteed by the federal government). Senator
Howard, however, spoke of the equal-protection and due process clauses in a broader sense
as intended to "abolish[] all class legislation and do[] away with the injustice of subjecting
one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.... It protects the black man in
his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white
man." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
14 The State may prescribe such regulations for every pursuit and calling of life as will
promote the public health, secure the good order and advance the general prosperity of
society, but when once prescribed, the pursuit or calling must be free to be followed by
every citizen who is within the conditions designated, and will conform to the
regulations.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110.
"' See, for example, the Court's analysis in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976):
Through mandatory retirement at age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by
assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police.... [M]andatory retirement at
50 serves to remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's
objective.
Id. at 314-15.
1 1 Some members of Congress had also referred to the need to enable Congress to enforce the privileges of Northerners in the South already protected by article IV. See supra
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Thus Miller may have been on the right track to suggest that
equal protection was a safeguard only against racial discrimination114 -though the use of the broader term "person" in contrast to
"citizen" in that clause and the fact that it would not be unreasonable to guarantee literally everyone equal protection in the narrow
sense suggest that his argument is more persuasive as applied to
privileges or immunities. Miller may also have been suggesting a
plausibly narrow interpretation of equal protection when he hinted
that the clause might apply only if justice was denied in the
courtsk---he seems to have had some perception that the clause
referred only to procedures for the redress of wrongs. What he
failed to do, however, was to read the privileges or immunities
clause broadly enough to accomplish what he acknowledged to be
the purpose of the amendment; 150 thereafter it seemed inevitable
that the Court would have to read the equal protection clause, despite its arguably distinct purpose, in such a way as to fill the
gap. 151 Just how the Court should have construed the privileges or
immunities clause it is not easy to say, but Miller seems to have
selected an interpretation particularly, difficult to reconcile with
the history of the amendment, 5 2 and without adequate attention
to the problem.
Just as Miller's opinion diverted discrimination analysis from
privileges or immunities to equal protection, it diverted fundamental-rights analysis to the due process clause. While his interment of
the privileges or immunities approach has so far been permanent,
the due process argument was to rise again despite the blows it
had received in the Legal Tender Cases 53 and in Slaughter-House

note 105. But power to punish violations of an existing duty is a far cry from a general
prohibition of classifications the Court finds unreasonable.
118See supra text accompanying note 102. Given this passage and others indicating
that "the pervading purpose" of all three civil-war amendments (13th-15th) was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him," 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71, it seems more than a little
odd to suggest, as Kutler does, that Miller's opinion "laid the foundation for the legal sub-

version of Negro hopes for full equality." See S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER

AND

RECONSTRUC-

TION POLITICS 165 (1968).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
0 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70; L. TRmE,supra note 45, at 419 n.26.
151

One result of this, as I shall argue in a subsequent study, was that the original pur-

pose of the equal protection clause was largely forgotten and the powers of Congress to
enforce it accordingly may have been too narrowly construed.
15 For a nearly contemporaneous criticism of the Court for ignoring the legislative history, see Royall, supra note 135, at 563.
1-S 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); see Currie VI,supra note 1, at 184-85.
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itself. All of this, however, is material for a later study, for only one
more fourteenth amendment case was decided before Chase's
death: Bradwell v. State,1 54 which immediately follows SlaughterHouse in the official reports.
If Field's theory of privileges or immunities had prevailed,
Bradwell would have been an interesting case testing whether the
amendment forbade only racial discrimination: it concerned an Illinois decision that only males could practice law. Justice Bradley,
who disagreed with Slaughter-House, had to face that issue in a
concurring opinion. In so doing, rather than limiting the clause to
race, he uttered some benighted observations about the woman's
place in the home, some of which he had the temerity to attribute
to "the Creator;" 15 5 his basic point was that the discrimination was
acceptable on the merits. After Slaughter-House, however, the
privileges or immunities claim was easy: as Miller said for the
Court, the clause did not forbid discrimination of every kind, and
there was no federal right to practice law.""s Most revealing with
respect to later developments is the total absence of any argument
that sex discrimination in bar admission offended the equal protection clause; apparently it had not yet occurred to anybody that
"protection of the laws" included the right to be a lawyer.
Chief Justice Chase dissented alone in Bradwell.157 Since he
had agreed with Slaughter-House's narrow interpretation of the
only clause relied on, it is impossible to see why; and he did not
have the courtesy to tell us.
CONCLUSION

The principal constitutional task of the Court under Chase
was to deal with the many important and varied issues arising directly or indirectly out of the Civil War. s Apart from the war issues, questions of the extent of congressional power were scarce
1- 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
155Id. at 141-42. Swayne and Field, who had also dissented in Slaughter-House,joined
Bradley's opinion.
156Id. at 139. An argument had also been made on the basis of article IV's guarantee of
equal privileges for citizens of other states. Miller's conclusive response was that although
Ms. Bradwell had been born in Vermont, she had become an Illinois citizen by residing
there, in accordance with the first clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 138; see also
Corker, Bradwell v. State: Some Reflections Prompted by Myra Bradwell's Hard Case that
Made "Bad Law", 53 WASH. L. REv. 215 (1978) (suggesting that the issue may have been
moot by the time the court decided it, since Illinois had passed legislation prohibiting most
sex-based restrictions on employment, Act of March 22, 1872, 1871-72 Ill.
Laws 578).
.57 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 142.
158 See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 133.
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and of relatively minor interest. The commerce clause was read,
not surprisingly, to authorize federal regulation of liquor sales to
Indians, 15 9 registration of ship mortgages,10 ° permission to build
railroad bridges, 61 and inspection of vessels carrying goods and
16 2
passengers on an intrastate portion of an interstate journey,
though the famous and peculiar decision in Paul v. Virginia that
states could regulate insurance because it was not commerce'6 3
seemed to mean that Congress could not regulate it at all. Thus
although the Court generally construed congressional powers amply,' 6 ' it was not prepared to ignore the fact that Congress had
only the powers the Constitution enumerated; and it made this
point by appropriately holding, in United States v. Dewitt, that
the only oil whose flammability Congress could limit was that moving in interstate or foreign commerce.165 Apart from the oath and
military-trial cases and the ups and downs of due process in the
two controversies over legal tender,16 6 little attention was given to
provisions limiting the enumerated congressional powers; of most
significance for the future was the plausible holding in Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co. that the flooding of land by a dam was a taking of
167
property within the meaning of the Wisconsin constitution.
159 United States v. Holiday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866) (Miller, J.).
160 White's Bank v. Smith, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 646 (1869) (Nelson, J.).
161 The Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 (1870) (Nelson, J.).
'o' The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1851) (Field, J.).
163 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (Field, J.) (alternative holding) ("The policies are
simple contracts of indemnity against loss by fire,. . . not articles of commerce ....
They
are not subjects of trade and barter offered in the market as something having an existence
and value independent of the parties to them ... ."); accord Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 410 (1871) (Nelson, J.); see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,
322 U.S. 533, 539, 546-47 (1944) (overruling this holding); supra note 75 (discussing the
alternative ground that the transactions in question were not interstate); infra text accompanying notes 182-84 (discussing whether the state law in Paul offended the privileges and
immunities clause).
I" Cf. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (Chase, C.J.) (upholding a privilege tax
on activities assumed to be beyond Congress's regulatory powers because, in contrast to the
steamboat license in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (see Currie HI, supra
note 1, at 941-42,) the statute did not purport to give a right to engage in the licensed
activities without regard to state law).
145 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870) (Chase, C.J.).
16 See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 182-84; see also Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S (13
Wall.) 654 (1872) (Swayne, J.) (suggesting without explanation that the due process clause
forbade congressional impairment of contracts); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493
(1871) (Swayne, J.) (holding due process not offended by revival of causes of action barred
by the statute of limitations during the war).
147 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872) (Miller, J.); see also Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 497 (1871) (Miller, J.) (holding in a case coming from federal circuit court, without
stating what provision was at stake, that a city could not order the removal, without compensation, of a wharf that posed no threat to navigation).
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Similarly, the reconstruction cases account for most of the important decisions of the Chase years respecting the powers of the
federal courts."6 8 In other expectable decisions the Justices reaffirmed that Congress could not subject the Court's decisions to revision by other branches," 9 held that a county was to be treated as
a "citizen" for diversity purposes, 170 and allowed removal from a
state court on the basis of a federal defense. 71 1 Auguring most for
the future was the appearance of two dissents from the decision in
Davis v. Gray,7 2 which seemed only to follow Marshall's holding in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States that the eleventh amendment
did not preclude suits to enjoin state officers from acting unconstitutionally;17 3 in the next few years the Court was to develop highly
74
sophisticated distinctions in this area.
18

See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 133, 144-68.

119 Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865) (without opinion). Taney's
draft opinion, belatedly printed at 117 U.S. 697 (1885) (Appendix), was not the opinion of
the Court. For antecedents, see Currie I, supra note 1, at 822-25, (discussing Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1799)), and Currie V, supra note 1, at 726 n.199 (discussing
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852)).
170 Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1869) (Chase, C.J.); cf. Marshall v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854) (fictitiously deeming all persons representing a private corporation to be citizens of its state of incorporation), discussed in Currie
V, supra note 1, at 723-24. In the case of a county this presumption makes more sense, see
P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1089 (2d ed. 1973), and the risk of bias seems quite real,
since otherwise the outsider would have to sue the county in its own courts.
,7, The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1868) (Swayne, J.). Marshall had presaged this result in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821), discussed in
Currie II, supra note 1, at 694, saying that a case arises under federal law whenever the
claim of either party relies on federal law, and many times (as in Cohens itself) the Court
had reviewed state-court decisions where a defendant's federal right had been denied. See
also Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870) (Nelson, J.) (properly holding the seventh amendment forbade retrial after removal of fact questions already determined by a
state-court jury); The Alicia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869) (Chase, C.J.) (holding Congress
without power to order transfer of appeals in prize cases to the Supreme Court on the highly
technical ground that the trial court's decree had been vacated by the filing of an appeal);
cf. Currie H, supra note 1, at 668-70 (discussing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75
(1807)).
.72 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873) (Swayne, J.). The suit was to enjoin a state official
from conveying to others lands claimed by the plaintiffs. Chase joined Davis's dissent. Id. at
233.
...22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), discussed in Currie H, supra note 1, at 695-701. The
dissenters (Davis and Chase) made no attempt to distinguish Osborn, saying in one brief
paragraph only that the effect of the decision was "to deprive the State of the power to
dispose, in its own way, of its public lands." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 233. Later cases were to
make it important whether title had already passed to the plaintiffs, but the Court gave this
question no attention, and it did not distinguish Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 110 (1828), which had placed an ill-defined limitation on Osborn.
17, On the related question of the implicit immunity of the federal government from
suit, see The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15 (1870) (Miller, J.) (allowing a salvage claim against
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By far the greater number of cases, as in the Taney period,
dealt with constitutional limits on the powers of the states. The
Slaughter-House Cases175 and Bradwell 76 seemed to portend a
narrow application of the new fourteenth amendment. The Court
finally invalidated two state taxes for obstructing interstate commerce,17 7 but on the whole it was not particularly aggressive in applying the limiting effect of the commerce clause. Contract clause
litigation, as usual, dominated the docket in terms of sheer numbers, but no interesting new questions were decided. 178 In obedi1 79
ence to Marshall's ill-conceived reasoning in Brown v. Maryland,
the imports-exports clause was held to bar nondiscriminatory taxes
on goods in the hands of their importer 8 ' but to allow taxes after
he had sold them, without even discussing whether they were discriminatory. 81 Paul v. Virginia8 2 confirmed the debatable impli-

government property because it was not in government possession); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 152 (1869) (Field, J.) (holding that the United States had consented to claims against
a fund by filing a claim of its own).
M See supra text accompanying notes 98-154.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 19-38, 66-75.
178 The Court reaffirmed that states could reserve the right to alter corporate charters,
e.g., Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 190 (1872) (Clifford, J.); it appeared
both to embrace and to reject the unexplained suggestion of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 175, 206 (1864) (see Currie IV, supra note 1, at 493-95) that the clause forbade judicial as well as legislative impairment. Compare Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
294, 303 (1866) (Swayne, J.) ("if the contract, when made, was valid . . . no subsequent
action by ... the judiciary can impair its obligation"), and Thomson v. Lee County, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 327, 331 (1866) (Davis, J.) ("change in judicial decision cannot be allowed to
render [contracts] invalid"), and Butz v. Muscatine, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 575, 583-84 (1869)
(Swayne, J.) (Court has as much duty "to protect the contract from [judicial action] as from
[legislation]"), with Railroad Co. v. Rock, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 177, 181 (1867) (Miller, J.) (invalidation by state court not unconstitutional unless in support of state statute), and Railroad Co. v. McClure, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 511, 515 (1871) (Swayne, J.) (state court invalidation
of bonds outside Court jurisdiction), and Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) 9, 10 (1872) (Swayne, J.) (state court refusal to enforce bank obligation outside
Court jurisdiction). See generally C. FABMAN, supra note 8, at 918-1116 (discussing Gelpcke
and other municipal bond cases). Most interesting was the addition of Miller, Chase, and
Field to the list of dissenters denying that states had power to give contractual tax exemptions. Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439, 443-44 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting); see Currie IV, supra note 1, at 490-93. Though he lost this battle, Miller's ideas would
soon persuade the Court in an analogous field of state regulation. See Stone v. Mississippi,
101 U.S. 814 (1880) (state had no power to promise not to revoke lottery charter). The
remaining 20-odd contract clause decisions merely applied settled law.
171 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); see Currie III, supra note 1, at 948-53.
180 Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872) (Field, J.); see supra note 48.
181 Waring v. Mayor, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110 (1869) (Clifford, J.).
182 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-82 (1869) (Field, J.); see also supra text accompanying
note 163 (discussing Paul's holding that insurance was not commerce).
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cation of Bank of Augusta v. Earle18 3 that corporations were not
"Citizen[s]" for purposes of article IV's privileges and immunities
clause despite what the Court had done for them under the similar
language of article III;I Ward v. Maryland properly repeated that

the clause forbade discriminatory taxes on out-of-state traders;185
and Bradwell v. State appropriately concluded that it ceased to
protect individuals who had become citizens of the state of whose
action they complained.18 6
More interesting are a handful of decisions dealing with implicit governmental immunities. On the one side, Collector v.
Day18 7 finally recognized, contrary to dicta in McCulloch v. Maryland'81 and to the thrust of the Veazie Bank case,18 9 that the constitutional argument that Congress could not tax the states was at
least as strong as its converse."' On the other, the Court was faithful to the purposes of federal immunity in holding, despite the implications of Cooley v. Board of Wardens,191 that Congress could
waive the implicit federal immunity, 9 2 and Tarble's Case reaf-

183

38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); see Currie V, supra note 1, at 729.

14 See supra note 170.

79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 432 (1871); see supra note 91.
186 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873); see supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
The full faith and credit clause was held in Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290
(1866) (Clifford, J.), not to permit one state to look behind another's judgment for fraud or
on the ground that the original claim had been barred by time; Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 108 (1870) (Swayne, J.), required respect for a divorce rendered at a wife's separate
domicile. See also the two confusing and minor full faith and credit decisions in Green v.
Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1867) (Clifford, J.), and 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139 (1869)
(Davis, J.) (writ of attachment granted by Illinois court in suit between New York citizens
binding on New York courts). The Court also reaffirmed the inapplicability of the Bill of
Rights to the states in the pre-fourteenth amendment cases of Pervear v. Commissioners, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867) (Chase, C.J.) (cruel and unusual punishment), and Twitchell v.
Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869) (Chase, C.J.) (right to be informed of charge).
181 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) (Nelson, J.).
188 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
189 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1870); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 170-74.
190 Cf. Currie VI, supra note 1, at 175 n.257 (discussing Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S.
185

(7 Wall.) 71 (1869)); Currie V, supra note 1, at 709-10 (discussing Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860)). See also United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 332
(1873) (Hunt, J.), decided after Chase's death but before the appointment of his successor,
barring a federal tax on interest paid to a city, which was treated as a state for this purpose-over dissents arguing the principle was inapplicable because the activity in question
was essentially proprietary. Cf. Currie II, supra note 1, at 700-01 (discussing Bank of United
States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824)).
191 53 U.S. (15 How.) 299 (1852); see supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
181 Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1866) (Nelson, J.). See also the peculiar decisions in Thomson v. Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579 (1870) (Chase, C.J.), that a
state may tax a federal corporation if it also gives it a charter, which hardly seems to reduce
the risk of disrupting federal interests, and in Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
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firmed the inability of state courts to free federal prisoners on the
apparent basis of McCulloch's argument that the states may not
impede federal functions."'9 Most important and most questionable, however, was the famous decision in Crandallv. Nevada,9 4 in
which the Court, after disdaining the aid of a commerce clause argument that had prevailed against an indistinguishable state law in
the immediately preceding case, 95 elected to rely on McCulloch for
the proposition that Nevada's tax on passengers leaving the state
interfered with government operations (and with an unpedigreed
correlative right of the citizen) by obstructing travel to government
offices-without saying that the passengers in question were on
their way to visit the government. This opinion was by Miller, who
would soon afterward hold, without invoking any constitutional
provision, that a city could not issue bonds to promote private industry.19 0 The natural-law overtones of the Crandall opinion were
reflected not only in Hepburn v. Griswold, from which Miller
loudly dissented, 197 but also in three contemporaneous decisions
rejecting state claims of what the Court viewed as extraterritorial
powers. 98 In another case, nevertheless, the Court emphatically
denied that it had authority to invalidate laws simply because they
offended "fundamental principles."' 99
Moving from the decisions to the Justices, one finds as usual
that the business of writing significant opinions was largely confined to a handful of the Court's members. Catron never sat after
Chase was appointed, Wayne disappeared without writing a word
after delivering a decisive vote against test oaths, and Hunt barely
594 (1868) (Clifford, J.), allowing the state to tax the franchise of a corporation though its
funds were partly invested in federal securities that, as reaffirmed in Banks v. Mayor, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 16 (1869) (Chase, C.J.), could not themselves be taxed.
19380 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872) (Field, J.); see Currie V, supra note 1, at 710-13 (discussing Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859)).

1" 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (Miller, J.).
195See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
194 Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875).
2- 75 U.S. (8Wall.) 603, 626 (1870); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 184.
199 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1873) (Field, J.); Railroad
Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1869) (Nelson, J.); Gilman v. Lockwood, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 409 (1867) (Clifford, J.); cf. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 655 (1829)
(Story, J.) (limiting reach of state authority to state territorial boundaries), noted in Currie
III, supra note 1, at 927 n.288. See also the unexplained holding denying city authority to
order removal of a wharf in Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1871) (see supra
note 167) which can probably be attributed to a state taking provision; and the suggestions
of natural law limits on retroactive legislation in Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
188 (1868) (Grier, J.), Locke v. New Orleans, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 172 (1867) (Field, J.), and
Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160 (1865) (Grier, J.).
"I Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610, 623 (1873) (Swayne, J.).
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put in an appearance at the end. Nelson was as inconspicuous as
he had been during twenty years with Taney, 20 0 Grier noteworthy
only because of the unfortunate effects of his senility in the legaltender controversy. 0 1 Clifford and Swayne, for perfectly adequate
reasons, were never assigned anything of importance; they were
two of the poorest opinion-writers ever to sit on the Court.20 2 Davis
wrote essentially nothing but that stirring and ultimately disappointing opinion against military trials in Milligan;20 3 it is surprising only that it took him so long to discover that he would really
be better off in the Senate. Even the famous Bradley, who served
only three years with Chase, barely got his feet wet during this
period, contributing little beyond a scattergun dissent in Slaughter-House,2 0 4 a few embarrassing remarks about women in
Bradwell,20 5 and a disturbing suggestion in the Legal Tender
Cases208 that Congress could do anything that governments were
ordinarily empowered to do.
We have reduced the field to four Justices: Miller, Field,
Chase, and Strong. The last of these is in a way the most remarkable, for in a time as brief as that of Bradley, Strong far outshone
his more celebrated colleague, writing opinions for the Court not
only in the towering Legal Tender Cases20 7 but also in the climactic railroad-tax cases 20° that represented the mature commerce
clause judgment of the Chase period. Chief Justices aside, only the
notable Curtis20 9 had been given such responsibility so soon. Moreover, though Strong's two commerce clause decisions appear poorly
explained to modern eyes, his Legal Tender opinion was both powerful and reminiscent of Marshall in its confidence that the men in
Philadelphia had granted us a perfect constitution.
Chase himself, appreciating like his two immediate predecessors the prerogatives of his office, dominated the civil-war and re-

200
201
201

See Currie V, supra note 1, at 746-49.
See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 174 n.255.
See C. FAIRmAN, supra note 8, at 77 ("In his day Clifford was at once the most prolix

and most pedestrian member of the Court."); see also Currie, The Most InsignificantJustice: A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 466, 473-77 (1983) (discussing Clifford's high
ranking on scale of Inanities Per Page).
203 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 133-39.
204 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1873); see supra note 105.
205 83 U.S. (4 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873); see supra text accompanying note 155.
20- 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 554 (1871); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 185 n.317.
20- 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 184-85.
200 Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873); State Tax on Railway
Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1873); see supra text accompanying notes 60-88.
209 See Currie V, supra note 1, at 744-45; Currie IV, supra note 1, at 506-10.
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construction cases, and in so doing he seems to have been more
2 11
211
politician than legal craftsman. ' ° In Johnson and McCardle
he saved the Reconstruction Acts from the risk of invalidation and
the Court from that of reprisal; in Klein23 he asserted the Court's
ultimate independence from Congress; in Texas v. White21 4 he
gave Radical theory the imprimatur of the judges. Not one of these
four opinions is satisfying from the standpoint of legal analysis.
Chase's opinions in the legal-tender controversies represent the triumph of policy preferences over legal reasoning. 215 That on the
taxation of state banknotes in Veazie, 16 with which his legaltender opinions clash, is little more than a bare conclusion; and so
is his concurrence in Milligan2 1 7 unnecessarily affirming the power
of Congress to authorize military trials. It is interesting that despite his propensity to assign important cases to himself he was
one of a minority who had nothing to say about the fourteenth
amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases.
Apart from Chase, clearly the most influential member of this
Court was Miller,21 and it was no fluke that it was he who spoke
for the Slaughter-House majority. 1 9 His name crops up everywhere, and everywhere it is associated with a strong and controversial position. Several times he expressed forceful and general theories of the commerce clause; often alone he continued to fulminate
against the effort to extend the contract clause to judicial action; it
was he who revived the cry that states could not contract away
their tax powers and elevated Taney's offhand remark about the
right to travel 2 0 to a constitutional principle in Crandall." " He
wrote always with exemplary clarity and brevity, and often with
210

See C.

71
212 73
213 80
21 74

FAIRMAN

supra note 8,at 1474-77.

(4 Wall.) 475 (1867); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 147-50.
(6 Wall.) 318 (1868); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 154-58.
(13 Wall.) 128 (1872); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 158-63.
(7 Wall.) 700 (1869); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 163-68.
" See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 185.
21" 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 170-74.
217 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 132 (1867); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at 137-38.
211See C. FAiRMAN, supra note 104, at 3 (quoting Chase's view that Miller was clearly
211

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

the" 'dominant personality'" on the Court in his early years), 63 (speaking of constitutional
law as a field where Miller's "preeminence was undisputed"), 248 (concluding that Miller's
"strength lay in the wisdom of his judgments rather than in the artistry of their doctrinal
elaboration"), 426 ("When Justice Miller died it was generally remarked that the Court had
lost the ablest of its members and the greatest figure in constitutional law since Marshall.").
21 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see supra text accompanying notes 98-154.
220 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (dissenting opinion); see Currie
IV, supra note 1, at 503 n.219.
221 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1868); see supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
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great effect; his dissents in the oath cases"' and in the first legaltender decision 22 3 are among the best reasoned opinions of the period. Sometimes, as in Hepburn2 2 4 and in the municipal bond
cases, 225 he was the reasonable voice of obedience to written law.
Other opinions, however, confirmed a tendency to reach the desired result without much attention to the relevant sources. 226 Further criticism may be directed at his cavalier dismissals of the
equal protection and due process claims in Slaughter-House227 and
his persistent contempt for precedent in commerce clause cases, 228
which made his inherently reasonable but ever-changing general
theories of the clause appear cynical afterthoughts designed to
shore up a preconceived determination. Most troubling, however, is
229
his free and easy fabrication of a right to travel in Crandall,
where even his own audacious thesis did not appear to support the
result he reached. The picture that emerges is of a strong judge
with unusually great abilities and little respect for the law.
I come at last to Field, who was destined to sit for nearly
thirty years with Miller and whose fundamental disagreements
with him were to form the central theme of Court history for
nearly twenty years after Chase had disappeared. This polarization
had manifested itself strongly before 1873. Field wrote to invalidate the test oaths23 0 and Miller to uphold them; Miller wrote the
majority opinion for the slaughtering monopoly and Field the most
notable opinion against it; 231 they wrote on opposite sides of the
legal-tender controversy. 23 2 Field was less likely to support Radical
measures than Miller, and later cases confirm Slaughter-House's

I" Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.

(4 Wall.) 333, 382 (1867); see Currie VI, supra note 1, at

141-43.
213 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 626 (1870); see Currie VI, supra note 1,
at 184.
224See Currie VI, supra note 1, at 181.
215 See supra note 178.
22 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44, 57, 80-84.
227 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873); see supra text accompanying notes 102-13.
226 See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Woodruff v. Parham, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869); supra text accompanying notes 43-44, 56-58.
229 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1868); see supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
230 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 374 (Field, J.), 382 (Miller, J.) (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316 (1868) (Field, J.); see Currie VI, supra note 1,
at 139-44.
231 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 57 (Miller, J., for the Court), 83 (Field, J., dissenting) (1873);
see supra text accompanying notes 128, 137-41, 145.
232 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457, 634 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 626 (1870) (Miller, J., dissenting); see Currie VI,
supra note 1, at 174-85.
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implication that he was more likely to find ways of protecting economic freedom. 23 3 In style Field was notably more prolix and pompous than Miller, but his best opinions-in Slaughter-House and
the oath cases-show that Miller had a worthy adversary in terms
of intellectual power.
With two strong and youthful Justices ranged on apparently
opposite sides of the major issues that were about to confront the
Court, the stage was set for the appointment of a new Chief Justice
in 1874.

"I E.g.,

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).

